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This paper focuses on a particular instance of migrant resistance: the
hunger strike of three hundred irregular migrants in 2011 in Greece. It
does not conceptualize the politics of migrant resistance as an isolated
incidence of mobilization of irregular migrants against the government
in support for their rights in existing institutions. By drawing on a set of
fifty-two face-to-face semi-structured interviews with migrant protesters
and organizers of the hunger strike, this paper rather argues that the
politics of migrant resistance is performed in the daily lives and day-to-
day activities of irregular migrants. It is performed by irregular migrants
and those who stand in solidarity with them through the mundane
production of information, tricks for survival, mutual care, social rela-
tions, services exchange, solidarity, and sociability, which challenge secu-
rity policies and controls and establish an alternative form of life. The
differential inclusion of irregular migrants in various social fields, and
the leeway that this inclusion potentially creates in their daily lives and
social relationships, enables irregular migrants to create ties with other
agents/actors in dominated positions in their social fields, who possess
and control the essential capital for the creation of these alternative
modes of life.
In January 2011, about three hundred irregular migrants from the Maghreb coun-
tries traveled from Chania, Crete, to Athens and Thessaloniki and started a forty-
four-day-long hunger strike. Supported by solidarity groups and NGOs, the protesters 
risked their lives but managed to achieve some concessions from the government,  
which slightly improved their legal status. This incident is not just one migrant mo-
bilization among various others. It is the largest hunger strike in Europe’s recent 
history, which has also involved the use of various material and human resources, 
triggering the state’s immediate response and dividing public opinion. All these 
factors, together with the fact that it is the most recent mass-organized migrant 
mobilization and, by extension, its protagonists could be more easily approached 
and interviewed, influenced the focus on this event.
This paper does not conceptualize the politics of migrant resistance as an isolated 
incidence of mobilization of three hundred irregular migrants against the govern-
ment in support for their rights in existing institutions; rather, it argues that politics 
of migrant resistance is performed in the daily lives and day-to-day activities of irregu-
lar migrants. It is performed by irregular migrants and those who stand in solidarity 
with them through the mundane production of information, tricks for survival, mu-
tual care, social relations, services exchange, solidarity, and sociability, which chal-
lenge security policies and controls and establish an alternative form of life. This be-
comes possible since irregular migrants are members of, and capable of moving in, 
various social fields at the same time. The differential inclusion of irregular migrants
in various social fields, and the leeway that this inclusion potentially creates in their
daily lives and social relationships, enables irregular migrants to create ties with
other agents/actors in dominated positions in their social fields, who possess and
control the essential capital for the creation of these alternative modes of life.
Protest in Greece has captured the international media’s attention in the past,
amid the worst economic crisis of the country’s modern history. The Greek debt
crisis that started to unfold in 2010 has further exacerbated the tensions between
natives and migrants and has altered the dynamic between state, citizens, and mi-
grants. Recent developments include the rise of nationalism, populism, anti-
immigration attitudes, hate crime and speech (Lazaridis and Skleparis 2016), and
the curtailment of the state’s capacity to provide assistance to asylum seekers and
refugees (Skleparis 2015). Furthermore, in 2015 alone, more than 800,000 asylum
seekers entered Europe through Greece. Meanwhile, the gradual closure of the
“Western Balkan route” in the EU after the November Paris attacks has forced a
large number of asylum seekers to stay in a country they don’t want to, and has
triggered various types of migrant protests, such as lip-sewing and hunger strikes
at the Greek–FYROM border, and riots in detention centers in Greece.
This paper utilizes a set of fifty-two face-to-face semi-structured interviews with mi-
grant protesters and organizers of the hunger strike, which were conducted in
Chania, Crete, in summer 2012. The next section puts forward an outline of the the-
oretical and methodological framework that is employed in this paper. Next, a chro-
nological account and further information about the context of the hunger strike,
and the profile and experiences of the protesters, is provided. Finally, the paper
proceeds to explore migrant agency through the three hundred hunger strikers’
formation of alliances, search for capital, and power positions within social fields.
The Politics of Migrant Resistance
Two, not so distinct, approaches to the study of the politics of migrant resistance
can be identified within the alternative transdisciplinary current that has been de-
veloped during the past twenty years: one that offers a critical reconceptualization
of migration and citizenship (Squire 2009, 146); and another one that argues that
migrants tend to act as citizens, because they are already citizens (Bojadzijev and
Karakayali, cited in Mezzadra 2011).
The former approach engages with challenges to the de-politicization of exclu-
sionary security practices, which are characterized by a rationality of solidarity and
can be understood as constituting political community, governance, and belonging
in terms that go beyond a territorial frame (Squire 2009, 146). Rather than perceiv-
ing refugees and migrants as passive, disempowered victims of exclusionary security
politics, it focuses on the various political mobilizations through which refugees
and migrants constitute themselves as political subjects (ibid.). Thus, the focus is
transferred to the question of how to make the reinsertion of political agency possi-
ble, while security is conceptualized as a method of governing that affects the con-
stitution or destitution of political agency (Huysmans and Squire 2010, 175).
Several researchers have analyzed citizenship claims as a mobile form of political
agency (e.g., McNevin 2006; Moulin and Nyers 2007; Squire 2009). McNevin
(2009) focuses on the growing political activism of irregular migrants in France,
the United States, and Australia and interprets it as a form of contestation of citi-
zenship, which may imply new forms of political belonging that move beyond a
conventional citizen/non-citizen divide. Nyers (2003) focuses on the campaign of
non-status migrants and refugees in Montreal to stop deportations. Through an
analysis of their claims and mobilizations, he provides an alternative conceptualiza-
tion of cosmopolitan citizenship from the perspective of the excluded; this concep-
tualization is located in concrete struggles and radically calls into question deeply
held assumptions about sovereignty and border control. Moreover, Nyers (2008)
analyzes acts of citizenship with regard to the growing political movement of non-
status migrants and refugees in Canada. By examining acts of self-identification
as non-status acts of claim-making and rights-taking, and acts of protest in street ral-
lies, marches, and detention centers, he evaluates the normative and political chal-
lenges that they pose to established norms of citizenship, belonging, and political
community. Finally, Nyers (2011) explores the concept of irregular citizenship by
drawing on the case of a Canadian citizen in order to highlight the gradual break-
down of the dividing line between “secure citizens” and “threatening migrants.” He
examines both practices of “unmaking”/“irregularizing” citizenship by the state
and acts of “self-irregularization” by activists who challenge liberal citizenship and
exceptionalist practices of control in favor of another way of being political.
The latter approach engages with belonging through the analytic lens of
capital–labor relations. It examines the connection of migrants’ citizenship with a
broader politics of labor subordination, and focuses on migrants’ agency, where
mobility is utilized by migrants as a means. In other words, migrants’ subjectivity
becomes the focal point and migration is understood as a political resource through
which people attempt to better their lives when states and other institutions no
longer provide adequate quality-of-life conditions (Rodriguez 1996; Mezzadra and
Neilson 2003; Mezzadra 2004). This approach is known as the “autonomy of
migration.”
This approach is based on the key assumption that migration is not a by-product
of socioeconomic and cultural structures, but an essential creative force in its own
right, capable of escaping political sovereignty and fueling social, cultural, and eco-
nomic transformations (Walters 2008). In this respect, security practices, such as
border controls, are more than just an attempt to control “illegal” migration;
rather, they are struggles “to resist attempts by working-class communities in pe-
ripheral countries to spatially reorganize their base of social reproduction in the
global landscape” (Rodriguez 1996, 23). Accordingly, border controls follow or re-
act to people’s decision for mobility, while they do not aim to exclude them, but
to include them by changing their status, making them in this way more vulnera-
ble to labor markets. Thus, “[t]he autonomy of migration actually aims to contrib-
ute to a deeper critical understanding of the reality of exploitation” (Mezzadra
2011, 123). In this regard, “[m]igration can be understood as a strategy of becom-
ing political” (Nyers 2008, 169), as it poses a social and political challenge to con-
trols on freedom of movement, even though only partly intentional and self-
conscious (Mezzadra 2004).
Moving in this direction, Tsianos and Karakayali (2010) focus on practices and
discourses of border controls in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey.
They reconceptualize borders and detention centers from “below” as attempts to
regulate the time, rather than the space, where transit migrants move. In this re-
spect, transit migrants are understood not as “spatially” excluded but as “tempo-
rarily” included into a global temporal regime of labor, where they are rendered
productive and exploitable by labor-market forces. This function of border con-
trols is equally shaped by the migrants and their carriers and the policy intentions
of the EU. Papadopoulos et al. (2008) make a similar point about detention cen-
ters in the Aegean Sea by arguing that they should be reconceptualized in their
“temporal” dimension as “speed boxes” that “decelerate” the speed of people’s
movement. Finally, Andrijasevic (2010) uses the Lampedusa detention center in
Italy as an example of the transformation that the European space, the formation
of its citizenship, and the structure of its labor markets are going through.
She maintains that detention centers and deportation practices in this region per-
form a “temporal” regulation of transit migration, which shapes and organizes
European citizenship through the principle of differential inclusion.
Indeed, both approaches tend to emphasize in their analyses of the politics of
migrant resistance the principle of differential inclusion, or else the creation of
different subjects of labor through the different modalities of entry into a country
and different residence statuses, which are designated by immigration controls
and legal requirements (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013, 181). As McNevin
(2006, 141) has put it, “irregular migrants are incorporated into the political com-
munity as economic participants but [are] denied the status of insiders. They are
immanent outsiders.” Emphasizing the differential inclusion of mobile popula-
tions automatically points to the way in which labor, mobility, and security are gov-
erned by citizenship (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013, 181). Yet, we cannot think
of citizenship as disconnected from sovereignty and control, since “[t]he limits of
citizenship are the limits of sovereignty,” and citizenship coexists with borders
(ibid., 183). In this sense, the more we talk about citizenship, the more we talk
about security, and the more we tend to conceptualize migrants through the
prism of citizenship, the more we tend to contribute to the creation of its others
(ibid., 183–84). This is because citizenship feeds from sovereignty’s power to cre-
ate and maintain borders that it cannot fully control, while it always remains a
non-exclusionary category, since citizenship for all is a contradiction in terms
(ibid.). Indeed, scholars in migration studies and political theory have highlighted
the exclusionary aspect of citizenship, stating that all-encompassing inclusion
within nation-states is essentially interconnected with the subordination of those
left outside (Brubaker 1992; Bader 1995; Yuval-Davis 1997; Joppke 1999; Isin
2002; Wallerstein 2003).
In this regard, Papadopoulos and Tsianos (2013, 192) have argued that auton-
omy of migration has somewhat neglected the ontology of migration by focus-
ing for too long on the discourse about citizenship rights, differential inclusion,
and control. Instead, the authors have put forward an understanding of migration
as “a process which relies on a multitude of other persons and things” (ibid.,
190), or else as “an organising practice for supporting and facilitating freedom of
movement” (ibid., 191). According to this understanding, immigrants and those
who stand in solidarity with them create a “world of knowledge, which includes in-
formation, tricks for survival, of mutual care, social relations, services exchange,
solidarity and sociability (ibid., 190); this “world of knowledge” can be shared,
used, sustained, and expanded as immigrants and those who stand in solidarity
with them contribute to it (ibid.). Within this context, irregularity is understood
as a condition that is used by migrants in order to facilitate their daily lives and
movements. This approach to autonomy of migration does not mean, of course,
that migration operates independently of control; it rather highlights the social
and subjective aspects of migration before control (ibid., 184). Indeed, a number
of studies have put forward valuable accounts of the various ways in which ir-
regular migrants create alternative forms of life in mainly local contexts with the
support of humanitarian NGOs or through their participation in a multitude
of institutions, such as political groups/associations, art collectives, churches,
schools, ethnic community groups, and so forth (Chavez 1991; Pincetl 1994;
Holston 1999; Coutin 2000, 2005; Isin 2000; Van der Leun 2003; Engbersen et al.
2006; Menjıvar 2006; Kalir 2010).
Subsequently, this approach produces a different understanding of the politics
of migrant resistance altogether, since contesting irregularity is not considered a
political act in itself (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013, 186). It sees political prac-
tices of migrants not as acts of resistance, but “as attempts to create a new situation
that allows those who have no part—to enter and change the conditions of social
existence altogether” (ibid., 188). This approach does not conceptualize politics of
migrant resistance as the mobilization of migrants against their oppressors in sup-
port for their rights in existing institutions (Bishop 2011); it rather sees the politics
of migrant resistance as the practice of creating alternative ways of daily existence
and alternative ways of living (Winner 1986). Thus, in this revisited approach, mi-
gration—or else the real struggles, practices, and tactics that escape control—is au-
tonomous, and can remain autonomous to the extent that it creates such forms of
daily existence and living (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013, 191). All in all, the pol-
itics of migrant resistance is an organizational ontology of alternative forms of life
that has “the ability to cultivate, generate and regenerate the contents, practices
and affects that facilitate the movements of mobile people” (ibid.). Papadopoulos
and Tsianos call this organizational ontology “mobile commons” (ibid.).
However, Papadopoulos and Tsianos have not spelled out the methodology for
studying the politics of migrant resistance through the prism of their revisited ap-
proach to autonomy of migration. This paper argues that Bourdieu’s concept of
field can provide valuable insights into the ways in which mobile commons is as-
sembled and materialized.
Bourdieu’s (1969) concept of field constitutes a key notion in the “Theory of
Practice.” The concept of field can be defined as a network, or a configuration, of
objective relations between positions objectively defined, in their existence and in
the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by
their present and potential situation . . . in the structure of the distribution of
power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that
are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions.
(Wacquant 1989, 39)
In other words, the field constitutes a distinct social locus marked by interde-
pendent and diverse positions (ibid.). It is a social arena characterized by struggles
that occur over particular resources, stakes, and access to them ( Jenkins 1992, 52).
The field, according to Bourdieu, is a structured system of social positions that are
occupied by either institutions or individuals, the status of whom dictates the condi-
tion for the agents that take them up (ibid., 53).
Bourdieu’s theory “can be used to explain how people can resist power and dom-
ination in one [field] and express complicity in another” (Moncrieffe 2006, 37).
Indeed, according to Bourdieu (1991, 245), those who are in similar yet distinct
patterns of social relations tend to form alliances with each other. It is within this
context that people at the bottom of a symbolic power system can resist domination
and generate the contents, practices, and affects that nurture people’s mobility and
render mobile people’s daily lives livable.
This assumption has led the present paper to focus on social fields where irreg-
ular migrants truly belong, and where they occupy and tend to accept subordinate
positions within the power hierarchy. However, according to Bourdieu, this does
not mean that there is no space for social change through resistance to domina-
tion. Resistance to domination can take place through the formation of alliances
with actors and agents that lie at the bottom of the symbolic power system in
other social fields. This does not mean, however, that power stops being distrib-
uted through fields in these instances of resistance, as individuals are simulta-
neously undergoing and exercising power (Foucault 1980, 98). Bourdieu (1991,
245–46) analyzes the ambiguous alliance between industrial workers, who are
dominated in their field, and intellectuals, “the dominated among the dominant”
within the field of power. Through the formation of a more or less durable alli-
ance based on a “conscious misunderstanding,” the latter supply to the former,
“by a sort of embezzlement of accumulated cultural capital, the means of consti-
tuting objectively their vision of the world” (ibid., 245). Thus, it is expected that
the three hundred irregular migrants that went on a hunger strike in Greece
sought and eventually formed alliances with agents that were dominated in their
social fields in order to help in the defense and extension of mobile commons; or
else, in order to assist in the facilitation of irregular migrants’ daily lives and
movements. In this respect, it is expected that one group will help the other be-
cause of the similarity/homology of their condition (ibid.).
A Chronology of the Hunger Strike
Four months prior to the commencement of the hunger strike, “Migrants’ Forum
in Crete,” a local NGO based in Chania, conceptualized and scheduled the pro-
test for November 2010 (Papagiannis 2011). Yet, various obstacles forced the
NGO to postpone the protest until January 2011, despite the fact that the build-
ings that would host the hunger strikers had already been chosen: the Athens Law
School and the Thessaloniki Labor Centre. On January 21, 2011, members of the
“Initiative for Solidarity” occupied an unused, newly refurbished building of the
Athens Law School—a deeply symbolic building (Walsh and Tsilimpounidi
2012).1 In the meantime, other members of the “Initiative for Solidarity” went to
Chania in order to accompany the protesters to the occupied buildings in Athens
and Thessaloniki. Two days later, the protesters had reached the venues and, on
January 25, the hunger strike began in Athens and Thessaloniki simultaneously.
In total, two hundred eighty-seven irregular migrants participated in the hunger
strike, following thirteen last-minute withdrawals: two hundred thirty-seven protes-
ters in the Athens Law School and fifty in the Labor Centre in Thessaloniki.
Inevitably, the hunger strike—an uncommon form of protest that falls outside
the normal “protest repertoires” (Tilly 1995, 26) and “collective action frames”
(Tarrow 1992)—attracted significant national and international media attention
and polarized Greek public opinion. Some of those who supported the protest
joined the “Initiative for Solidarity,” which organized demonstrations and music
concerts, among other events, in support of the protesters. The hunger strikers,
on the other hand, formed their own collective body, the “Assembly of Migrant
Hunger Strikers.” Each body held daily separate meetings, but there was also com-
munication between them across the two cities via webcams.
On January 28, the protesters were escorted by the police and members of the
“Initiative for Solidarity” to a nearby privately owned building called “Ypatia,” after
they were forced to evacuate the Athens Law School building amid great pressure
from state authorities. In the meantime, the hunger strike in Thessaloniki contin-
ued uninterrupted. The transfer of the protesters to “Ypatia” not only removed
them from the public sphere (Mantanika and Kouki 2011), but the hunger strik-
ers also complained that many of them were forced to sleep outdoors in tents,
due to the building’s space limitations. Nevertheless, the protesters, through their
spokespersons and those who stood in solidarity with them, attempted to commu-
nicate and publicize their grievances through press conferences, interviews, the
distribution of brochures, and the organization of events such as concerts and
marches (Karyotis and Skleparis 2014).
Throughout the hunger strike, the medical team of the solidarity movement
was monitoring the deteriorating health of the protesters. On the seventeenth
day of the hunger strike, seven participants were withdrawn from the protest on
medical grounds, while a number of others were hospitalized during the forty-
four days of the hunger strike’s duration. Despite the possibility of loss of human
lives, which would be a blow to the government’s legitimacy and image (Dingley
and Mollica 2007), state officials refrained from meeting with the hunger strikers’
representatives until the later phase of the protest. On March 9, 2011, a deal was
reached with the government that put an end to the hunger strike in return for
some changes to the protesters’ legal status. Instead of full regularization, the pro-
testers were offered a biannually renewable status of “indefinite tolerance,”
1The Athens Law School is a symbol of the struggle against the military dictatorship, as the student demonstra-
tions that started from that building in 1973 resulted in the fall of the regime a few months later.
permission to visit their countries of origin, and a promise to be granted work
permits. Furthermore, the government conceded to the regularization of all mi-
grants in Greece who could prove their continuous residence in the country for
at least a decade, knowing full well that the vast majority of migrants in Greece
would be unable to provide the necessary supporting documents for the imple-
mentation of this measure, as past experience had proven (see Fakiolas 2003).
Last but not least, the deal with the government included the reduction of
the necessary pension credits for the annual renewal of residence permits of all
migrants from two hundred to one hundred and twenty, and the reduction of the
essential credits for the issue of health insurance booklets from one hundred to
sixty (Karyotis and Skleparis 2014).
The Three Hundred Irregular Migrant Hunger Strikers
All of the interviewees were Maghreb nationals: forty-eight Moroccans, two
Algerians, and two Tunisians. Moreover, nine out of ten were in their mid-to-late
twenties and single. With respect to their employment status, 40% had a full-time
job, 37% were working part-time, and 19% were unemployed at the time of the in-
terview. The majority of the interviewees were primarily employed in the construc-
tion sector, as well as in the tourist industry and agriculture. Similar to the Greek
citizens, the economic crisis had gravely affected the living conditions of the inter-
viewees, as nine out of ten admitted that their life was worse compared to before
the crisis. The scarcity of employment opportunities amid the economic crisis was
identified as the main problem by almost all interviewees. Increased racism and
anti-immigration discourse in the realm of politics was also a significant cause of
concern, although only a large minority, 46%, had a first-person experience of ei-
ther verbal or physical abuse.
Furthermore, seven out of ten interviewees had been living in Greece for more
than five years. Only one out of ten respondents initially came to Greece through
a legal channel (i.e., a student or tourist visa). The rest entered Greece irregularly
via the Greek–Turkish sea border (70%) or the Greek–Turkish land border
(21%). The most important reasons for entering Greece were to use the country
as a transit to another EU member-state (69%), or to pursue better living condi-
tions (64%) or employment (62%). These findings challenge two well-known
migration pull factors—the knowledge of welfare provisions and the presence of
existing large migrant communities—which do not apply in this case (Karyotis
and Skleparis 2014). All in all, 60% stated that they would like to move elsewhere
in the EU or go back to their country of origin.
Figure 2 demonstrates the attitudes of the hunger strikers regarding the role that
main actors played, directly or indirectly, in the protest. Unsurprisingly, the role of
solidarity groups (92%) and the hunger strike organizers (67%) was evaluated posi-
tively by the majority of the interviewees. By contrast, the role of the government
(8%) and the police (17%) in the hunger strike was evaluated positively only by a
small minority. All in all, the limited concessions and broken promises of the gov-
ernment left a sour taste in the mouth of the hunger strikers (Karyotis and Skleparis
2016). Indeed, the mean average of the interviewees’ responses with respect to the
level of fulfilment of the goals of the hunger strike was just 3.1 on a 0–10
scale, where 0 means “not at all” and 10 means “absolutely,” which reflects the disap-
pointment of the participants about its outcomes (Karyotis and Skleparis 2014).
The Formation of Alliances and the Search for Capital
Social networks and NGOs were instrumental in the organization of the three
hundred irregular migrants’ hunger strike. Support came from migrant groups
and networks, NGOs, antiracist and university student bodies, labor associations,
neighborhood initiatives, anarchist collectives, and political parties, particularly
those to the left of the ideological spectrum. Members of these actors joined
forces to create the “Initiative for Solidarity” with the hunger strikers. Yet, these al-
liances with dominated actors in their social fields were not opportunistic; rather,
they were based on pre-existing organizational networks and social relationships,
or in other words on pre-existing systems of production of mobile commons,
which facilitated the mobilization, or else the maintenance/defense and expan-
sion of mobile commons.
Members of the Migrants’ Forum in Crete conceptualized and started the prep-
arations for the hunger strike months before the actual protest took place.
Indeed, the NGO played a key role in the protest. This collective, formed in
February 2007 in Chania, is composed of both native and migrant members, and
claims regularization of all immigrants in Greece. It is a very politically active
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group, and its repertoire of actions includes dissemination of information
and raising awareness regarding the problems of migrants and refugees, interven-
tion at the level of political institutions, and the organization of various forms of
collective action such as leafleting, marches, demonstrations, football games, con-
certs, and more radical forms of protest. Indeed, the Migrants’ Forum in Crete or-
ganized both the 20082 and 2011 hunger strikes. Moreover, it is a network hub
with strong ties with various other organizations, such as the “Maghreb Arabi
Association.” The latter is also based in Chania and was founded in 2006. Its mem-
bers are exclusively nationals from the Maghreb countries. The ties between
these two organizations are so strong that they share the same headquarters and
all Maghreb Arabi Association members are also members of the Migrants’ Forum
in Crete.
This explains why both hunger strikes were based on ethnic mobilization.
With regard to the 2011 hunger strike mobilization, a small core of volunteers ini-
tiated a campaign to recruit participants on a door-to-door basis. Concurrently,
other volunteers went to Athens, Thessaloniki, and Volos to mobilize further sup-
port, explore options, and assess the feasibility of the planned action. Indeed,
data confirm that nine out of ten interviewees first heard about the hunger strike
through face-to-face contact.
However, the role of social networks is not confined to the organization of the
hunger strike and the recruitment of participants. A few days prior to the com-
mencement of the protest, left-wing university student parties proposed, during
an assembly of Athens Law School students, the occupation of one of the school’s
buildings in order to host the hunger strikers. Their proposal was accepted by the
student body, despite the fact that other student parties strongly opposed the de-
cision. Eventually, on January 21, 2011, members of the solidarity movement occu-
pied a building of the Athens Law School and paved the way for the imminent
commencement of the strike. Moreover, as previously mentioned, other members
of the solidarity initiative traveled to Chania to accompany the migrants to the
venues, on rented buses, where required. In addition, when the government
made clear that the hunger strikers had to evacuate the Athens Law School build-
ing, members from the solidarity initiative participated in the search for a new
place that could host the protesters.
Furthermore, on January 28, the third day of the strike, when hunger
strikers were forced by the police to evacuate the Law School building, it was the
solidarity initiative and numerous other supporters that escorted and marched
with the protesters to the new building that would host the hunger strikers. And
when this building was found unsuitable to host all of the protesters due to space
limitations, it was a nearby squat that eagerly accommodated some of the hunger
strikers till arrangements were made. Moreover, it was the solidarity initiative’s
medical team that monitored the health of the protesters throughout the strike
and it was members of the initiative and other supporters that escorted some of
the strikers to the hospitals when needed. Finally, it was the spokespersons and
supporters of the hunger strike that, during the protest, publicized the partici-
pants’ grievances through press conferences, interviews, distribution of leaflets,
and the organization of events including music concerts and marches. All these
constitute evidence that the hunger strike could not have taken place without the
crucial support of its allies.
These findings are in accordance with Bourdieu’s thoughts on resistance, which
suggest that in such instances, individuals/groups at the bottom of the power hi-
erarchy within a field tend to form alliances with other individuals/groups in a
2On November 11, 2008, fifteen irregular migrants from the Maghreb countries started a twenty-six-day hunger
strike outside Chania Town Hall, which forced the government to concede to their demands and grant them resi-
dence and work permits.
similar situation who possess and have the ability to control cultural/symbolic
capital. Yet, these findings also suggest that the alliances that were formed were
neither random nor opportunistic, as they were based on the pre-existing organi-
zational networks and social relationships that can be found within a field. In fact,
a large majority of the respondents (62%) were members of either the Migrants’
Forum in Crete or the Maghreb Arabi Association—in other words, the very actors
that assisted in the organization of the hunger strike in the beginning. What is
more, individuals/groups with access to symbolic, material, and human capital
are particularly sought as potential allies in instances of maintenance/defense
and the expansion of mobile commons.
Thus, material, symbolic, and human capital also played a crucial role in the zsuc-
cessful 2011 hunger strike mobilization. Regarding the former, each member of
the Migrants’ Forum in Crete is obliged to contribute on a monthly basis a small
amount of money depending on his/her income. If the member has no income,
there can be an exemption from this obligation. Thus, every month volunteers col-
lect the membership fee, which helps cover the running expenses of the collective.
This policy of monetary contributions proved to be particularly useful prior to and
during the hunger strike. For instance, the expenses for the ferry tickets of the hun-
ger strikers from Chania to Athens were partly covered by these fees. The rest of
the ticket expenses as well as other expenses incurred by the hunger strike were
covered by emergency contributions by the solidarity initiative.
In terms of human and symbolic capital, one must take into account the experi-
ence acquired from the 2008 hunger strike. The actors that organized this protest
were the same as those who organized the 2011 hunger strike: the Migrants’
Forum in Crete and the Maghreb Arabi Association. Apart from the experience of
organizing a successful hunger strike, the human and symbolic capital available to
the three hundred hunger strikers also included a network of supporters, which
was formed and galvanized in the 2008 mobilization. Moreover, one should not
ignore the 15% of the respondents that participated, in one form or another, in
the 2008 hunger strike. These migrants were an invaluable asset to the 2011 hun-
ger strike as they transferred their “status,” firsthand experience, and know-how
to the new mobilization. Finally, we should also consider the important role of
militants and leadership in the successful mobilization. Indeed, according to a
public statement of the Migrants’ Forum in Crete (2011), the hunger strikers
were “pioneers of the migration movement,” who constituted “by far its most pro-
gressive part.”
This section demonstrated the crucial role that alliances played in the organi-
zation of the hunger strike, the recruitment of participants, and the maintenance
of the protest; or in other words, in the maintenance/defense and expansion of
mobile commons. It is safe to argue that the three hundred irregular migrants’
hunger strike could not have taken place without the availability of pre-existing net-
works of allies that were willing to support it; or else, the hunger strike could not
have taken place without pre-existing systems of production of mobile commons
willing to defend relations of justice amid current capitalist power and sovereign
control. Moreover, this section underlined the key role of material, human, and
symbolic capital in the generation of mobile commons. Without the membership
money of the Migrants’ Forum in Crete and the emergency contributions of the
supporters; without the experience and know-how from a previous hunger strike;
without the people that could transfer these assets from one protest to another;
and without the availability of skilled and active militants that could guide the mo-
bilization, it is doubtful whether the 2011 hunger strike could have ever taken
place. These findings are in line with Papadopoulos’s and Tsianos’s work on the
idea of mobile commons. Yet, these findings also suggest that alliances—which are
of fundamental importance in the creation, maintenance, and expansion of mobile
commons—between disempowered actors within different fields are not formed on
an opportunistic basis, but they follow a pattern of pre-existing organizational net-
works and social relationships, while actors who possess symbolic, material, and/or
human capital play key roles in the formation of alliances. Indeed, the hunger
strike, as a process of maintenance and expansion of mobile commons, was itself
the outcome of a process of generation of mobile commons.
Irregular Migrants, Social Fields, and Daily Resistance
The three hundred irregular migrants in Greece formed alliances with a number
of actors and agents that were dominated in their social fields: migrant groups
and networks, NGOs, antiracist and university student bodies, labor associations,
neighborhood initiatives, anarchist collectives, political parties, and so forth.
Particularly those to the left of the ideological spectrum joined forces to create
the “Initiative for Solidarity” with the hunger strikers. The “Initiative for
Solidarity” provided the hunger strikers with the essential cultural capital in order
to claim their vision of the world. These alliances were not formed on an opportu-
nistic basis. They followed a pattern of pre-existing organizational networks and
social relationships, while actors who possessed symbolic, material, and/or human
capital played a crucial role in the formation of these alliances. It is the social field
as a whole within which irregular migrants live that has the potential to generate
mobile commons, and allows for the formation of such alliances, which can main-
tain and extend mobile commons. This paper calls for a careful examination of
the very position that dominated agents/actors occupy within a field, as it can
play a key role in the process of creation of mobile commons on a daily basis.
Even within the context of securitization of migration in Greece (Karyotis and
Patrikios 2010; Karyotis 2012; Karyotis and Skleparis 2013; Lazaridis and Skleparis
2016; Skleparis 2016), alternative ways of daily existence and of living are still pos-
sible (Karyotis and Skleparis 2016). This happens because irregular migrants
move in various social fields simultaneously. All in all, the fact that irregular mi-
grants lie at the bottom of the power hierarchy does not rule out the possibility
that they can enjoy considerable leeway in their daily lives and social relationships
within various social fields, such as the economy, healthcare, housing, and public
transport. It is within these fields that irregular migrants in Greece resist domina-
tion in their daily lives, despite their subordinate position, by using their irregular-
ity as a means to facilitate their daily existence and movements. Irregularity does
not essentially entail more subordination, but rather a form of resistance to state
control (Garce´s-Mascare~nas 2015).
Greek legislation has explicitly securitized and criminalized irregular migrants’
access to labor and housing markets, healthcare services, and public transporta-
tion. With regard to their level of access to the labor market, about nine out of
ten protesters responded that they were dissatisfied. This answer has to do with
Greek legislation being particularly strict regarding the inclusion of irregular mi-
grants in the labor market, as it has defined penalties for employers who hire ir-
regular migrants (Law 3386/2005). Indeed, Law 3386/2005 has criminalized any
form of solidarity from the private sector, such as access to employment.
Prior to the economic crisis, migrants without work permits were not entirely
banned from the labor market. Rather, the securitization of irregular migrants’
access to the labor market rendered them vulnerable to labor exploitation and
their relations with their employers precarious (De Giorgi 2010). Greek legisla-
tion was, and still is, very restrictive, excluding migrants without work permits
from the labor market and defining severe penalties for those who employ them.
However, in reality, employers seemed to prefer (and still do) irregular migrants
over native ones in certain jobs, due to the fact that they constitute a very cheap
and hardworking labor force (Calavita 2003). In other words, irregular migrants
had opportunities for inclusion in the labor market, albeit opportunities that ren-
dered them vulnerable to severe labor exploitation due to the unregulated char-
acter of their labor relations. Thus, despite all obstacles, irregular migrants were
enjoying considerable leeway in their daily lives and social relations within the
economic field prior to the economic crisis. Irregular migrants were able to find a
job through their social relations, even if it was insecure, underpaid, and/or with-
out health insurance. Indeed, “[t]he mobile commons is not outside of existing
relations of production, reproduction and even exploitation” (Papadopoulos and
Tsianos 2013, 191).
Yet, the economic crisis meant fewer jobs and lower salaries for both migrants
and natives, and one of the sectors that was immediately affected by the crisis
was that of construction; that is, the sector where the majority of the respondents
were, and still are, employed. Thus, the economic crisis played a significant role
in the exacerbation of the already problematic differential inclusion of irregular
migrants in the labor market. The impact of the economic crisis has been uni-
formly detrimental to the respondents’ living conditions, with nine out of ten in-
terviewees noting that their life is worse compared to before the crisis. Along
these lines, the scarcity of employment opportunities was mentioned as the main
issue of concern by almost all respondents, which justifies the aforementioned
dissatisfaction.
Regarding the level of access of irregular migrants to the housing market, eight
out of ten interviewees expressed their satisfaction. This is surprising if one con-
siders the restrictive nature of the relevant legislation, which bans irregular mi-
grants from renting a house altogether. Yet, landlords in Greece very often defy
the severe penalties that the law foresees for those who provide housing to irregu-
lar migrants. The ongoing economic crisis and the plethora of empty houses that
it created only strengthened this tendency. Thus, the regulation of illegal housing
in Greece is only in theory securitized, as in reality irregular migrants enjoy signifi-
cant leeway in the housing field—there is always somebody that knows someone
who can provide an affordable flat.
Moreover, half of the interviewees answered that they were dissatisfied with their
level of access to healthcare services. In general, this is a low percentage of dissatis-
faction considering that Greek legislation bans the provision of free healthcare ser-
vices to irregular migrants, except in emergency cases (Law 3386/2005). In this
respect, one would expect that the respondents would have been unable to get any
medical care and by extension they would have voiced much higher levels of dis-
satisfaction. However, one has to take into account the local context where the
respondents resided. In other words, the micro-society of Chania helped irregular
migrants through interpersonal relations/ties and acquaintances get informal ac-
cess to healthcare services. Additionally, those interviewees who expressed satis-
faction with their level of access to healthcare services could have been the most
embedded in local NGOs and, thus, could have been able to take advantage of po-
tential links with healthcare units. Finally, one cannot dismiss the possibility that
doctors simply defied the law and provided their services to irregular migrants out
of pure empathy and humanitarianism. Thus, despite the securitization of irregular
migrants’ access to healthcare services, they still have some opportunities for inclu-
sion in practice, even if it is informal and at the local level.
Finally, 77% of the interviewees expressed satisfaction with their level of access to
public transport. Again, this is surprising if one takes into account that Greek legis-
lation bans irregular migrants from using means of public transportation, while it
foresees severe penalties, similar to those for trafficking, for the offenders (Law
3386/2005). Nevertheless, despite the restrictive legislation, the controls in means
of public transportation, such as buses and taxis, are almost non-existent.
Furthermore, ferry, coach, and train controls on internal routes are deficient.
Indeed, this argument is supported by the fact that the two hundred eighty-seven ir-
regular migrants managed to travel by ferry from Chania to Athens, and then fifty
of them by coach from Athens to Thessaloniki, completely uninterrupted. Thus, al-
though irregular migrants’ access to the field of public transport appears to be se-
curitized, there is still significant leeway available in their internal movement.
Although the interviews with the protesters were conducted 1.5 years after the
end of the hunger strike, when the protesters had some form of legal residence,
these findings are indicative of the protesters’ feelings of frustration prior to
their mobilization too. Indeed, when the interviewees were asked about their life
changes after their participation in the hunger strike, they addressed various
positive (e.g., ability to visit home country, residence permit) and/or negative
(e.g., mental and health problems, loss of job) changes. Additionally, they iden-
tified changes in the attitudes of Greeks toward them for better (e.g., less
harassment in the street by the police) or for worse (e.g., stigmatization due to
participation in the hunger strike). However, none of the interviewees mentioned
changes with regard to their access to the labor market, housing, healthcare ser-
vices, and public transportation, which suggests that their respective levels of satis-
faction/dissatisfaction as regular migrants are indicative of their prior status as
irregular migrants.
All in all, these findings suggest that despite the protesters’ position at the bot-
tom of the power hierarchy, they were still able to enjoy significant leeway in their
daily lives and social relations prior to the hunger strike in various social fields,
such as the economy, housing, healthcare, and public transport. This is explained
by the fact that irregular migrants are members of, and are capable of moving in,
various social fields. Indeed, the fact that individuals/groups are dominated in a
field does not rule out the possibility that these very individuals/groups can enter
into power struggles and resist domination in their daily lives in various other social
fields. In the case of the irregular migrant hunger strikers, the protesters drew
upon their relations of care and support—such as mutual cooperation, friendships,
favors that you never return, affective support, and so forth—in the fields of econ-
omy, healthcare, housing, and public transport in order to change their daily lives
and make them more livable amid current capitalist power and sovereign control.
These pre-existing organizational networks and social relationships or, in other
words, these mobile commons rendered the maintenance/defense and further ex-
tension of mobile commons through the hunger strike feasible.
All in all, mobile commons is assembled and materialized in various fields of
daily life: i) in a multiplicity of informal economies, where irregular migrants’ ac-
cess to not easily accessible public or private services can be facilitated through the
provision of information regarding, for instance, how to find and how to pay a doc-
tor or a lawyer; how to find short-term or more permanent employment; how to
send and receive money; how to get the necessary papers for your move; and how
to pay for your rent and how to find the right intermediaries, among others
(Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013, 191); ii) in diverse forms of transnational com-
munities of justice, such as alliances and coalitions between different groups, local
governments, social movements, political organizations, NGOs, and so forth, where
irregular migrants can acquire access to power and self-organization (ibid.); and iii)
in the field of care, which includes relations of care and support, such as mutual co-
operation, friendships, favors that you never return, affective support, trust, transna-
tional relations of care, and so forth (ibid., 192).
Thus, the politics of migrant resistance, according to this revisited approach to
autonomy of migration, aims to facilitate migration through the multiplication,
spreading and extending any of the aforementioned properties of mobile com-
mons, through the installation of relations of justice by a multiplicity of actors
amid current capitalist power and sovereign control (ibid.). It is a form of thick
justice, which can be achieved through changing daily life in a way that enables
people to move when they want or need to, and to live a livable life in the place
where they choose to reside (ibid.).
Conclusion
This paper argued that the politics of migrant resistance is performed in the
daily lives and day-to-day activities of irregular migrants. It is performed through
the mundane generation of mobile commons, a political act of resistance in itself,
which can potentially lead to instances of maintenance/defense and extension of
mobile commons, such as the hunger strike of the three hundred irregular mi-
grants in Greece. Both in the day-to-day generation of mobile commons and the in-
stances of maintenance/defense and extension of mobile commons, the formation
of alliances with actors/agents who possess cultural, symbolic, material, and/or
human capital is equally important. In the case of the three hundred irregular
migrant hunger strikers, migrant groups and networks, NGOs, antiracist and
university student bodies, labor associations, neighborhood initiatives, anarchist
collectives, random people who stand in solidarity with migrants, and political
parties, particularly those to the left of the ideological spectrum, assisted in the cre-
ation of alternative ways of daily existence and alternative ways of living. In other
words, irregular migrants and those who stand in solidarity with them created a
“world of knowledge,” which included information, tricks for survival, mutual care,
social relations, services exchange, solidarity, and sociability, which resisted security
policies and controls, establishing an alternative form of life. Hence, when the exis-
tence of this mobile commons was threatened by the economic crisis and an immi-
nent migration law amendment (see Karyotis and Skleparis 2014, 2016), irregular
migrants turned for support to pre-existing organizational networks and social
relationships or, in other words, to pre-existing systems of production of mobile
commons, in order to defend, maintain, and extend it through the hunger strike
mobilization. This was possible due to the fact that irregular migrants are members
of, and capable of moving in, various social fields at the same time. The differential
inclusion of irregular migrants in Greece in the fields of economy, housing, health-
care, and public transport, and the considerable leeway that they enjoyed in their
daily lives and social relationships therein, enabled irregular migrants to create ties
with other agents/actors, in homological positions in their social fields, who pos-
sessed and controlled cultural, symbolic, material, and/or human capital.
This paper drew upon a revisited approach to autonomy of migration, which in-
troduces the idea of mobile commons—that is, the facilitation of migration
through the installation of relations of justice by a multiplicity of actors amid cur-
rent capitalist power and sovereign control. This paper attempted to make a
methodological contribution to autonomy of migration, which draws upon
Bourdieu’s thoughts on resistance. Bourdieu’s theory “can be used to explain
how people can resist power and domination in one [field] and express complic-
ity in another” (Moncrieffe 2006, 37). According to this line of thought, actors/
agents who occupy and tend to accept subordinate positions within the power hi-
erarchy of a field tend to form alliances with actors/agents in homological posi-
tions in other fields. This paper provided support for Bourdieu’s argument that
dominated actors/agents resist domination through the formation of alliances
with actors/agents who occupy similar positions. Yet, it added that these alliances
are not formed on an opportunistic basis; rather, they follow pre-existing organi-
zational networks and social relationships and are formed on a day-to-day basis
with actors/agents who possess cultural, symbolic, material, and/or human
capital. In this respect, the production, maintenance/defense, and expansion of
mobile commons depends on the existence of durable alliances with dominated
agents/actors in various social fields who possess and control cultural, symbolic,
material, and/or human capital.
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